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Abstract
We consider the problem of governing systemic risk in a banking system model.
The banking system model consists in an initial value problem for a sys-
tem of stochastic differential equations whose dependent variables are the log-
monetary reserves of the banks as functions of time. The banking system model
considered generalizes previous models studied in [5], [4], [7] and describes an
homogeneous population of banks. Two distinct mechanisms are used to model
the cooperation among banks and the cooperation between banks and mone-
tary authority. These mechanisms are regulated respectively by the parameters
α and γ. A bank fails when its log-monetary reserves go below an assigned de-
fault level. We call systemic risk or systemic event in a bounded time interval
the fact that in that time interval at least a given fraction of the banks fails.
The probability of systemic risk in a bounded time interval is evaluated using
statistical simulation. A method to govern the probability of systemic risk in
a bounded time interval is presented. The goal of the governance is to keep
the probability of systemic risk in a bounded time interval between two given
thresholds. The governance is based on the choice of the log-monetary reserves
of a kind of “ideal bank” as a function of time and on the solution of an opti-
mal control problem for the mean field approximation of the banking system
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model. The solution of the optimal control problem determines the parame-
ters α and γ as functions of time, that is defines the rules of the borrowing
and lending activity among banks and between banks and monetary authority.
Some numerical examples are discussed. In particular during a two year period
we consider the governance of systemic risk in the next year when governance
decisions are taken quarterly. The systemic risk governance is tested in absence
and in presence of positive and negative shocks acting on the banking system.
1 Introduction
Given an interacting system made of agents that can fail individually, the systemic
risk associated to the system is the risk that a large number of agents fails simulta-
neously leading to the failure of the entire system. Physical systems, epidemiological
systems, engineering systems and banking systems are some of the numerous exam-
ples where systemic risk occurs. Given the relevance of these systems it is easy to
understand that assessment and governance of systemic risk are important issues.
For example in the case of banking systems it is well known that in developed coun-
tries the regulation and the correct functioning of these systems are necessary for the
well being of the whole economy. In these countries specific political and technical
authorities are responsible for the banking system management. For simplicity we
identify these authorities with the monetary authority.
For a survey of the multifaceted aspects of systemic risk we refer to [9], [3] and to
the references therein. In particular in recent times mathematical models have been
used to study systemic risk in the financial sector, see, for example, [1], [2], [5], [4],
[8], [11], [12], [7]. In this paper we are concerned with assessment and governance of
systemic risk in a mathematical model of a banking system. The agents of our model
are the financial institutions, that, for simplicity, are identified with the banks that
are represented through their log-monetary reserves. The log-monetary reserves of a
bank are simply the logarithm of the monetary reserves of the bank.
The banking system model presented generalizes the models studied in [5], [4], [7]
and describes an homogeneous population of banks. In the model the log-monetary
reserves of the banks as functions of time are represented as interacting diffusion
processes defined implicitly by a system of stochastic differential equations (see equa-
tions (23), (24), (3)). The model consists in an initial value problem for this system
of stochastic differential equations. In the model each bank interacts with the other
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banks and with the monetary authority. We say that a bank is failed when its log-
monetary reserves go below a given level called default level and that systemic risk
in a bounded time interval occurs when in that time interval at least a given fraction
of the banks of the model fails. Two cooperation mechanisms act in the model. The
first one is the borrowing and lending activity among banks. The second one is the
borrowing and lending activity between banks and monetary authority. These mech-
anisms are governed respectively by the parameters α and γ (see equation (23)). The
mechanism that models the borrowing and lending activity among banks is the same
one used in [5]. The borrowing and lending activity between banks and monetary au-
thority depends from the difference as function of time between the empirical mean of
the log-monetary reserves of the banks of the system and a target trajectory, chosen
by the monetary authority, that represents the log-monetary reserves as a function of
time of a kind of “ideal bank”. Note that since in the model the bank population is
homogeneous all the banks should behave as the “ideal bank”. The banking system
model presented in this paper (i.e. equations (23), (24), (3)) generalizes the model
introduced in [5] where only the inter-bank cooperation mechanism is considered and
uses ideas taken from [4], [7].
We study the properties of the banking system model (i.e. of equations (23),
(24), (3)), and we derive its mean field approximation. Using statistical simulation
we evaluate the probability of systemic risk in a bounded time interval. We show
quantitatively that increasing the rate of cooperation among banks and between
banks and monetary authority increases the safety of the individual bank, but, in some
circumstances, increases also the probability of “extreme” systemic risk in a bounded
time interval. Extreme systemic risk means failure of all the banks or of almost all
the banks. We present a method to govern the probability of systemic risk in a
bounded time interval based on the mean field approximation of the banking system
model. This method pursues the goal of keeping the probability of systemic risk in
a bounded time interval between two given thresholds and depends from the choice
made by the monetary authority of a target trajectory for the log-monetary reserves
of the ideal bank as a function of time. This choice is translated in rules for the
banks (i.e. is translated in the values of the parameters α and γ as functions of time)
through the solution of an optimal control problem for the mean field approximation
of the banking system model.
We present some numerical experiments to illustrate the behaviour of the banking
system model and of the systemic risk governance. In particular we present the
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simulation of the systemic risk governance during a two year period. In the simulation
governance decisions are taken quarterly and consist, at the beginning of each quarter,
in the evaluation of the probability of systemic risk in the next year in absence of
governance decisions, in the consequent choice of a target trajectory for the log-
monetary reserves of the ideal bank in the next year and in the translation of this
choice in rules for the banks. The choice of the target trajectory of the log-monetary
reserves of the ideal bank in the next year is done with a simple trial and error
procedure. The systemic risk governance is tested in presence of positive and negative
shocks acting on the banking system.
Note that the behaviour of the banking system model is governed through its
mean field approximation. That is a possibly high dimensional dynamical model
(i.e. the banking system model) is governed with a control law determined using a
low dimensional dynamical model (i.e. the mean field approximation of the banking
system model). This is possible since in an homogeneous population of banks each
bank behaves as a kind of mean bank and from the governance of the mean bank it
is possible to deduce how to govern the entire bank population. The same idea can
be exploited in all the circumstances where an homogeneous population of agents is
studied.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the banking
system model developed in [5], [4] is reviewed, moreover failure of a bank and systemic
risk in a bounded time interval are defined. In Section 3 the banking system models
studied in this paper are introduced, their mean field approximation is deduced and
the probability of systemic risk in a bounded time interval is evaluated. In particular
in Sections 2 and 3 we investigate, in the banking system models considered, the
relation between safety of the individual bank and safety of the banking system. In
Section 4 we solve an optimal control problem for the mean field approximations of
the banking system models studied in Section 3 and we show how to translate the
solution of the control problems studied in rules for the banks, that is in values of
the parameters α and γ as functions of time. Finally in Section 5 a method to govern
systemic risk in a bounded time interval is presented and tested in some numerical
examples.
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2 The Fouque and Sun banking system model and
the definition of systemic risk in a bounded time
interval
For the convenience of the reader we begin reviewing the banking system models
presented in [5], [4]. Let t be a real variable that denotes time and N > 1 be the
number of banks present in the banking system model at time t = 0. Note that due
to the possible failure of banks during the time evolution the number of banks in the
model is not necessarily constant. For i = 1, 2, . . . , N let Y it , t > 0, be a diffusion
process representing the log-monetary reserves of the i-th bank as a function of time.
In [5] the first dynamical model considered to describe a system of N banks is
the following system of stochastic differential equations:
dY it = σdW
i
t , t > 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , N, (1)
with the initial condition:
Y i0 = y
i
0, i = 1, 2, . . . , N, (2)
where σ is a constant, the stochastic processesW it , t > 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , N, are standard
Wiener processes such that W i0 = 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , N, and dW
i
t , t > 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , N,
are their stochastic differentials. Moreover as done in [5] we assume that:
E(dW it dW
j
t ) = δi,jdt, t > 0, i, j = 1, 2, . . . , N, (3)
where E(·) denotes the expected value of · and δi,j , i, j = 1, 2, . . . , N , is the Kronecker
symbol. Note that in (1) the diffusion coefficient σ is the same in all the equations.
The initial conditions yi0, i = 1, 2, . . . , N, are random variables that, for simplicity, are
chosen to be concentrated in a point with probability one. We identify these random
variables with the points where they are concentrated. For simplicity we choose (see
[5]):
Y i0 = y
i
0 = 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , N. (4)
In the model (1), (4), (3) all the banks are equal, that is the bank population
described by (1), (4), (3) is homogeneous. All the banking system models considered
in this paper describe homogeneous populations of banks.
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In [5] Fouque and Sun introduce an interaction among banks adding a set of
drift terms to the model (1), (4), (3). These drift terms represent the rate of inter-
bank borrowing and lending activity. That is the equations (1) are replaced by the
following system of stochastic differential equations:
dY it =
α
N
N∑
j=1
(
Y jt − Y
i
t
)
dt+ σdW it , t > 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , N, (5)
where α ≥ 0 is called rate of mean-reversion. The overall rate of “mean reversion”
α
N
is normalized dividing the parameter α by the number N of banks, see [5] for more
details.
For i = 1, 2, . . . , N the cooperation of the i-th bank with the other banks is
described by the term
α
N
N∑
j=1
(
Y jt − Y
i
t
)
dt, t > 0, of the i-th equation of system (5)
and is governed by the parameter α. These terms establish that for t > 0 and for
j = 1, 2, . . . , N , if at time t bank j has more reserves than bank i (i.e. if Y jt > Y
i
t )
money flows from bank j to bank i, and this flow is proportional to the difference
Y jt −Y
i
t at the rate
α
N
, the opposite happens if bank i has more reserves than bank j
(i.e. if Y jt < Y
i
t ). The interaction mechanism among banks given by (5) is based on
the idea that “who has more gives to those who have less”, and is a simple form of
cooperative behaviour between banks. Note that when α = 0 there are no monetary
flows among banks, and system (5) reduces to system (1).
In [5] the mean field approximation of the dynamical system (5), (4), (3) is
studied. In particular it is shown that the mean field limit of (5), (4), (3) when N
goes to infinity is the initial value problem:
dYt = −αYtdt+ σdWt, t > 0, (6)
Y0 = 0, (7)
where Wt, t > 0, is a standard Wiener process such that W0 = 0 and dWt, t > 0,
is its stochastic differential. The stochastic process Yt, t > 0, solution of (6), (7)
represents the time evolution of the log-monetary reserves of a kind of “mean-bank”
of the bank population described by (5), (4), (3). Due to the homogeneity of this
bank population when N goes to infinity all the banks of model (5), (4), (3) behave
like the “mean-bank” described by (6), (7).
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For a detailed explanation of mean field theory in its original context, that is in
the context of statistical mechanics, see, for example, [6] and the references therein.
Given a banking system model (i.e. equations (1), (4), (3) or (5), (4), (3) or ...)
let us define the default of a bank in a bounded time interval and its probability. For
i = 1, 2, . . . , N the default of the i-th bank in a bounded time interval is defined as
follows: chosen a default level D < 0 bank i defaults in a bounded time interval if in
that time interval its log-monetary reserves Y it , t > 0, reach level D. That is, given
0 ≤ τ1 < τ2 < +∞, the time interval [τ1, τ2] and a default level D, we define the
event F i[τ1,τ2], “default of the i-th bank in the time interval [τ1, τ2]”, as follows:
F i[τ1,τ2] =
{
min
τ1≤t≤τ2
Y it ≤ D
}
, i = 1, 2, . . . , N. (8)
Given a banking system model (for example equations (1), (4), (3) or (5), (4), (3)
or ...) for i = 1, 2, . . . , N to the event “default of the i-th bank in the time interval
[τ1, τ2]” is associated a probability. Note that we assume that failed banks are removed
from the banking system model considered. Let us give a formal definition of systemic
risk or of systemic event in a bounded time interval and a quantitative measure of
its probability in a banking system model. Let int [·] be the integer part of ·, and
M be a positive integer such that M ≥ int
[
N
2
]
, we define systemic risk of type M ,
or systemic event of type M , in the time interval [τ1, τ2] the event: “during the time
interval [τ1, τ2] at least M banks fail”. In this paper we choose M = int
[
N
2
]
+ 1.
That is SR[τ1,τ2], the systemic risk or systemic event of type M = int
[
N
2
]
+ 1 in the
time interval [τ1, τ2], is defined as follows:
SR[τ1,τ2]=
{
at leastM= int
[
N
2
]
+1 banks fail in the time interval [τ1, τ2]
}
. (9)
Let P(·) denote the probability of the event ·. Given a banking system model,
using statistical simulation, we evaluate the probability of the event F i[τ1,τ2], i =
1, 2, . . . , N, and the probability of the event SR[τ1,τ2]. This is done using a set of nu-
merically simulated trajectories of the banking system model considered and approxi-
mating the probability of F i[τ1,τ2], i = 1, 2, . . . , N, or of SR[τ1,τ2] with the corresponding
frequency in the numerically simulated trajectories.
Note that the definition (9) of systemic risk in the time interval [τ1, τ2] is different
from the one used in [5]. In fact in [5] systemic risk or systemic event in the time
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interval [τ1, τ2] is defined as follows:
SR[τ1,τ2] =
{
min
τ1≤t≤τ2
Y¯t ≤ D
}
, (10)
where
Y¯t =
1
N
N∑
j=1
Y jt , t > 0, (11)
is the empirical mean of log-monetary reserves of the banks.
In [5] given the default level D < 0 the probability P(SR[τ1,τ2]) of the event
defined in (10) is studied as a function of α when N becomes large. The study of
P(SR[τ1,τ2]) is based on the theory of large deviations. Note that the definition of
failed bank (8) adopted here is the same one adopted in [5]. However in [5] a bank
failed during the time evolution remains in the banking system model and continues
to be part of the time evolution defined by (5), (4), (3). This last assumption makes
easier the study of the probability P(SR[τ1,τ2]) using the theory of large deviations,
see [5]. Instead we assume that when a bank fails leaves the banking system model.
That is after defaulting the failed bank does not continue to be part of the borrowing
and lending activity of the banking system model and the variable that describes it is
removed from the system of equations (5). The non failed banks continue their time
evolution that is governed by the dynamical model that remains after the removal.
We prefer to use (9) and the rules specified above as definition of systemic risk in
a time interval instead of adopting the definition and the rules given in [5]. In fact
we believe that the assumptions made here are more realistic than those made in [5].
Moreover the probabilities P(SR[τ1,τ2]) defined in (9) and P(SR[τ1,τ2]) are both easily
evaluated using statistical simulation.
Fouque and Sun in [5] show that the introduction of the terms
α
N
N∑
j=1
(
Y jt − Y
i
t
)
dt,
t > 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , N , in (5) stabilizes the behaviour of the individual bank (i.e. de-
creases the default probability of the individual bank) at the expense of increasing
the probability of extreme systemic risk, that is the probability of systemic risk of
type M when M is very close to N . In fact the trajectories of (5), (4), (3) when
α > 0 are more grouped near the straight line y = 0 than those of (1), (4), (3).
This “swarming” or “flocking” effect of the trajectories of (5), (4), (3) is a conse-
quence of the presence of the inter-bank cooperation mechanism and increases when
α increases. The same effect is present in the trajectories of the mean field limit
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initial value problem (6), (7) due to the term −αYt, t > 0, (α > 0) in (6). That
is the “swarming” trajectories of (5), (4), (3) reach the default level rarely (i.e. the
stability of the individual bank increases when α increases), but due to the swarming
effect when they reach the default level they reach the default level all together and
systemic risk occurs. In particular the probability of extreme systemic risk increases
when α increases.
In Figures 1a)-3a) we show one trajectory of Y 1t , t ∈ [0, T ], T = 1, solution of
(5), (4), (3) when N = 10 and one trajectory of Yt, t ∈ [0, T ], T = 1, solution of
(6), (7) for three different values of α, that is for α = 1 (Figure 1a)), α = 10 (Figure
2a)) and α = 100 (Figure 3a)). As suggested in [5] we choose D = −0.7, σ = 1
and we use the explicit Euler method with time step ∆t = 10−4 to integrate the
initial value problems (5), (4), (3) and (6), (7) from time t = 0 up to time t = T ,
T = 1. Note that in Figures 1a)-3a) it is sufficient to represent one trajectory of
Y 1t , t ∈ [0, T ], T = 1, solution of system (5), (4), (3) to illustrate the behaviour
of the corresponding trajectory of system (5), (4), (3). In fact the bank population
considered is homogeneous and the processes Y it , t ∈ [0, T ], T = 1, i = 1, 2, . . . , N ,
behave all in the same way. As expected, increasing α, that is increasing the rate
of cooperation among banks, increases the “swarming” effect around the line y = 0
of the trajectories of (5), (4), (3), and, as a consequence, decreases the number of
defaults in the time interval [0, T ], T = 1, increasing the stability of the system. In
Figures 1a)-3a) the dotted line shows the default level D = −0.7.
Let us consider the loss distribution in the time interval [0, T ], T = 1, i.e. the
probability distribution of the random variable: number of bank defaults in the time
interval [0, T ], T = 1. In the model (5), (4), (3) when N = 10 the loss distribution
in [0, T ], T = 1, is evaluated using statistical simulation starting from 104 simulated
trajectories of the model. Note that the loss distributions shown in Figures 1b)-3b)
are computed using the definition of systemic risk (9) and using the assumptions
about bank failure made in this paper. In Figures 1b)-3b) the dashed line shows the
loss distribution in [0, T ], T = 1, of system (1), (4), (3) when N = 10, while the solid
line denotes the loss distribution of system (5), (4), (3) when N = 10 and α = 1 (see
Figure 1b)), α = 10 (see Figure 2b)) and α = 100 (see Figure 3b)). Note that in the
case of independent diffusion processes, i.e. when we consider system (1), (4), (3),
or when we consider α = 0 in (5), (4), (3), the loss distribution in [0, T ], T = 1, is a
binomial distribution with known parameters. When N = 10 let us look more closely
to the loss distribution in [0, T ], T = 1, of the diffusion processes solution of (5), (4),
9
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Figure 1: a) The solid line shows one trajectory of the solution Y 1
t
, t ∈ [0, T ], T = 1, of system (5),
(4), (3) when N = 10, α = 1. The thick solid line shows one trajectory of the solution Yt, t ∈ [0, T ],
T = 1, of the corresponding mean field initial value problem (6), (7). The dotted line shows the
default level D = −0.7. b) Loss distribution in [0, T ], T = 1, of system (5), (4), (3) when N = 10,
α = 1 (solid line) and loss distribution in [0, T ], T = 1, of system (1), (4), (3) when N = 10 (dashed
line).
(3) as a function of α. This distribution is plotted with a solid line in Figures 1b)-
3b). These distributions have a large mass near zero defaults together with a small,
but not negligible, mass near N defaults. These features of the loss distribution of
(5), (4), (3) and their behaviour as functions of α when α increases show that the
cooperation mechanism among banks present in (5), (4), (3) increases the stability of
the individual bank, however it increases also the probability of “extreme” systemic
risk in the time interval [0, T ], T = 1. This last fact is shown in Figure 4 where we
zoom the right-bottom corner of Figure 1b)-3b). Figure 4 shows that the “tail” of
the loss distribution raises when α increases.
Note that the different definitions of systemic risk used in [5] (i.e. (10)) and in
this paper (i.e. (9)) do not change the qualitative behaviour of the systemic risk
probability as a function of α shown in Figures 1-4.
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Figure 2: a) The solid line shows one trajectory of the solution Y 1
t
, t ∈ [0, T ], T = 1, of system
(5), (4), (3) when N = 10, α = 10. The thick solid line shows one trajectory of the solution Yt,
t ∈ [0, T ], T = 1, of the corresponding mean field initial value problem (6), (7). The dotted line
shows the default level D = −0.7. b) Loss distribution in [0, T ], T = 1, of system (5), (4), (3) when
N = 10, α = 10 (solid line) and loss distribution in [0, T ], T = 1, of system (1), (4), (3) when
N = 10 (dashed line).
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Figure 3: The solid line shows one trajectory of the solution Y 1
t
, t ∈ [0, T ], T = 1, of system
(5), (4), (3) when N = 10, α = 100. The thick solid line shows one trajectory of the solution Yt,
t ∈ [0, T ], T = 1, of the corresponding mean field initial value problem (6), (7). The dotted line
shows the default level D = −0.7. b) Loss distribution in [0, T ], T = 1, of system (5), (4), (3) when
N = 10, α = 100 (solid line) and loss distribution in [0, T ], T = 1, of system (1), (4), (3) when
N = 10 (dashed line).
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Figure 4: a) Zoom of the right-bottom corner of Figure 1b) (α = 1). b) Zoom of the right-bottom
corner of Figure 2b) (α = 10). c) Zoom of the right-bottom corner of Figure 3b) (α = 100).
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3 A banking system model with two cooperation
mechanisms
Let us introduce the banking system model studied in this paper. The log-monetary
reserves as functions of time of theN banks present in the banking system are modeled
by the diffusion processes X it , t > 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , N . These diffusion processes
are defined implicitly through an initial value problem for a system of stochastic
differential equations. In the model we use the cooperation mechanism present in
(5) to describe the inter-bank borrowing and lending activity, and we introduce a
new cooperation mechanism to describe the borrowing and lending activity between
banks and monetary authority. This last mechanism depends from the difference
as function of time between the empirical mean of the log-monetary reserves of the
banks and a target trajectory ξt = ξ(t), t ≥ 0, chosen by the monetary authority that
represents the log-monetary reserves of the “ideal bank” as a function of time.
Given α ≥ 0, γ ≤ 0, σ > 0, we begin modeling the dynamics of the log-monetary
reserves of the banks with the following system of stochastic differential equations:
dX it =
α
N
N∑
j=1
(
Xjt −X
i
t
)
dt+
γ
N
N∑
j=1
(
Xjt − ξt
)
dt+ dξt + σdW
i
t ,
t > 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , N, (12)
with the initial condition:
X i0 = ξ0, i = 1, 2, . . . , N, (13)
where ξt = ξ(t), t ≥ 0, is a continuous piecewise differentiable function and dξt =
dξt
dt
dt = (ξt)
′ dt, t ≥ 0. The initial value problem (12), (13) is completed with
the assumption (3). Note that with abuse of notation in (13) ξ0 is a random variable
concentrated in the point ξt=0, with probability one. We assume ξ0 ≥ 0 and ξt−D > 0,
t > 0, where D is the default barrier.
In (12) the parameter α ≥ 0 regulates the first cooperation mechanism expressed
by the terms
α
N
N∑
j=1
(
Xjt −X
i
t
)
dt, t > 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , N, that controls the inter-bank
borrowing and lending activity (see Section 2). The term dξt, t > 0, of (12) is a part
of the intervention of the monetary authority in the banking system dynamics and is
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responsible for the fact that the drift terms
α
N
N∑
j=1
(
Xjt −X
i
t
)
dt, t > 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , N,
stabilize the trajectories of X it , t > 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , N, around ξˆt = ξt, t > 0, instead
than around ξˆt = ξ0, t > 0, as done in (5), (4) where we have ξ0 = 0 (see Section 2). In
(12) the parameter γ ≤ 0 regulates the second cooperation mechanism expressed by
the term
γ
N
N∑
j=1
(
Xjt − ξt
)
dt, t > 0, added to the i-th equation, i = 1, 2, . . . , N . That
is γ controls the strength of mean reversion of the empirical mean of the log-monetary
reserves of the banks
1
N
N∑
j=1
Xjt to the target trajectory of the log-monetary reserves
of the “ideal bank” ξt, t > 0. Equations (12) through the term proportional to γ
impose that the mean of the log-monetary reserves of the banks of the system (i.e.
1
N
N∑
j=1
Xjt , t > 0) reverts to the log-monetary reserves of the “ideal bank” (i.e. ξt,
t > 0). In the model (12), (13), (3) the bank population is homogeneous and when N
goes to infinity each bank behaves like the mean bank. That is the target trajectory
ξt, t > 0, represents the “ideal” log-monetary reserves of each bank and Nξt, t > 0,
represents the “ideal” target trajectory of the log-monetary reserves of the banking
system. The parameter γ controls the rate of the borrowing and lending activity
between banks and monetary authority. That is the second cooperation mechanism
of the model is regulated by γ and stabilizes the empirical mean of the diffusion
processes X it , t > 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , N, along the target trajectory ξt, t > 0. In fact the
term
γ
N
N∑
j=1
(
Xjt − ξt
)
dt, t > 0, of (12) can be rewritten as γ
(
1
N
N∑
j=1
Xjt − ξt
)
dt,
t > 0.
Let us derive the mean field approximation of the banking system model (12),
(13), (3). First of all let us rewrite the system of equations (12) as follows:
dX it = α
[(
1
N
N∑
j=1
Xjt
)
−X it
]
dt + γ
(
1
N
N∑
j=1
Xjt − ξt
)
dt+ dξt + σdW
i
t ,
t > 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , N. (14)
Summing the equations (14) for i going from 1 to N , and dividing the resulting
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equation by N we have:
d
(
1
N
N∑
i=1
X it
)
= γ
(
1
N
N∑
j=1
Xjt − ξt
)
dt+ dξt + d
(
σ
N
N∑
i=1
W it
)
, t > 0. (15)
Let
X¯t =
1
N
N∑
j=1
Xjt , t > 0, (16)
be the empirical mean of the processes Xjt , t > 0, j = 1, 2, . . . , N . Equation (15) can
be rewritten as follows:
dX¯t = γ
(
X¯t − ξt
)
dt+ dξt + d
(
σ
N
N∑
i=1
W it
)
, t > 0. (17)
The assumption (3) and the strong law of large numbers imply that:
1
N
N∑
i=1
W it −→ 0, t > 0, almost surely, when N −→ +∞. (18)
Let X¯t, t > 0, be the limit as N goes to infinity of the empirical mean X¯t, t > 0, and
Xt, t > 0, be the process representing the log-monetary reserves of the “mean-bank”
of the banking system model (12), (13), (3) in the limit N goes to infinity. The
mean field approximation of the dynamical system (12), (13), (3) can be deduced
immediately from (14), (17). In fact when N goes to infinity from (14), (17) we have:
dXt = α
(
X¯t − Xt
)
dt+ γ
(
X¯t − ξt
)
dt+ dξt + σdWt, t > 0, (19)
dX¯t = γ
(
X¯t − ξt
)
dt+ dξt, t > 0, (20)
X0 = ξ0, X¯0 = ξ0. (21)
The initial value problem (19), (20), (21) is the mean field approximation of the
dynamical system (12), (13), (3). Note that equations (20) and (21) imply that
X¯t = ξt, t > 0, therefore in (19) γ is multiplied by zero. This means that the
choice of γ does not influence the trajectories of (19). That is the second cooperation
mechanism introduced in (12) does not contribute to the mean field approximation
(19), (20), (21) of (12), (13), (3). This is undesirable since we want to use the mean
field approximation (19), (20), (21) to determine the parameters α, γ that must be
used to govern the banking system model (12), (13), (3). To avoid this inconvenience
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let us modify the banking system model (12), (13), (3). Starting from the target
trajectory ξt, t ≥ 0, we introduce two auxiliary target trajectories ξ
−
t , ξ
+
t , t ≥ 0,
such that ξ−t 6= ξ
+
t , t ≥ 0, obtained from ξt, t ≥ 0, with a “slight” perturbation. For
example, given ǫ > 0, we choose ξ−t , ξ
+
t , t ≥ 0, as follows:
ξ−t = ξt − ǫ, t ≥ 0, ξ
+
t = ξt + ǫ, t ≥ 0. (22)
We replace (12), (13) with the system of stochastic differential equations:
dX it =
α
N
N∑
j=1
(
Xjt −X
i
t
)
dt+ γ
(
1
N
N∑
j=1
Xjt − ξ
−
t
)
dt+ dξ+t + σdW
i
t ,
t > 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , N, (23)
with the initial condition:
X i0 = ξ
+
0 , i = 1, 2, . . . , N, (24)
where, with abuse of notation, ξ+0 denotes a random variable concentrated in the
point ξ+t=0 with probability one. The initial value problem (23), (24) is completed
with the assumption (3).
The system of equations (23), (24), (3) is the banking system model with two
cooperation mechanisms studied in this paper. The two cooperation mechanisms of
model (23), (24), (3) are the same of those of model (12), (13), (3). However in
model (23), (24), (3) the inter-bank borrowing and lending mechanism, governed by
α, stabilizes the system around the trajectory ξ+t , t ≥ 0, and the banks-monetary
authority borrowing and lending mechanism, governed by γ, stabilizes the system
around the trajectory ξ−t , t ≥ 0, and we have ξ
+
t 6= ξ
−
t , t ≥ 0.
Proceeding as done previously in the study of model (12), (13), (3) it is easy to
see that the mean field approximation of the dynamical system (23), (24), (3) is:
dXt = α
(
X¯t − Xt
)
dt+ γ
(
X¯t − ξ
−
t
)
dt+ dξ+t + σdWt, t > 0, (25)
dX¯t = γ
(
X¯t − ξ
−
t
)
dt+ dξ+t , t > 0, (26)
X0 = ξ
+
0 , X¯0 = ξ
+
0 , (27)
where Xt, t > 0, is a stochastic process that represents the time evolution of the
log-monetary reserves of the “mean-bank” of model (23), (24), (3) and X¯t, t > 0, is
an auxiliary variable.
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For simplicity we use the same variables X it , i = 1, 2, . . . , N, X¯t, Xt, X¯t, t > 0, to
denote the dependent variables of the models (12), (13), (3) and (23), (24), (3) and
of the corresponding mean field equations (19), (20), (21) and (25), (26), (27).
Let us point out that the models (12), (13), (3) and (23), (24), (3) can both be
governed using (25), (26), (27). In fact instead of (23), (24), (3) we can consider (12),
(13), (3) as banking system model and we can use the mean field equations (25),
(26), (27) as shown in Section 4 to govern (12), (13), (3). We prefer to choose (23),
(24), (3) as banking system model since with this choice the banking system model
is governed through its mean field equations. Model (12), (13), (3) can be governed
with the method presented in Section 4 through the auxiliary dynamical system (25),
(26), (27) but cannot be governed using its mean field approximation (19), (20), (21)
since in (19) γ is multiplied by zero.
For later purposes in the banking system model (23), (24), (3) and in its mean
field approximation (25), (26), (27) from now on we allow the parameters α and γ to
be functions of time. That is in (23), (24), (3) and in (25), (26), (27) we assume:
α = αt ≥ 0, t ≥ 0, γ = γt ≤ 0, t ≥ 0. (28)
It is easy to see that the functioning of the two cooperation mechanisms present in
(23), (24), (3) remains unchanged when we consider α = αt ≥ 0, t ≥ 0, γ = γt ≤ 0,
t ≥ 0, to be functions of time.
Instead of choosing ξt, t ≥ 0, and ǫ the monetary authority can choose an interval
of the real axis as function of time, that is the interval
[
ξ˜−t , ξ˜
+
t
]
, t ≥ 0, defined by
two target trajectories ξ˜−t , ξ˜
+
t , t ≥ 0, such that ξ˜
−
t < ξ˜
+
t , t ≥ 0. In this case ξt, t ≥ 0,
can be defined as the arithmetic mean of ξ˜−t , ξ˜
+
t , t ≥ 0.
Figures 5a)-7a) show one trajectory of X1t , t ∈ [0, T ], T = 1, solution of model
(23), (24), (3), and one trajectory of Xt, t ∈ [0, T ], T = 1, solution of the initial value
problem (25), (26), (27), when ξ(t) = 0.5 sin(2πt), t ∈ [0, T ], T = 1, ǫ = 0.05, and
the constants α, γ are chosen as follows: α = 100, γ = −10 (see Figure 5a)), α = 50,
γ = −50 (see Figure 6a)) and α = 10, γ = −100 (see Figure 7a)). As done in Section
2 we choose N = 10, D = −0.7, σ = 1 and we use the explicit Euler method with
time step ∆t = 10−4 to integrate numerically the stochastic differential models (23),
(24), (3) and (25), (26), (27), for t ∈ [0, T ], T = 1. In Figures 5a)-7a) the dotted
line shows the default level D = −0.7, the dashed line shows the target trajectory
ξ(t) = 0.5 sin(2πt), t ∈ [0, T ], T = 1. In Figures 5a)-7a) we show only one trajectory
17
of X1t , t ∈ [0, T ], T = 1, solution of model (23), (24), (3) since the bank population
described by (23), (24), (3) is homogeneous and the processes X it , t ∈ [0, T ], T = 1,
i = 1, 2, . . . , N , behave all in the same way.
Let us study the loss distribution in the time interval [0, T ], T = 1, of the diffusion
processes solution of (23), (24), (3), that is let us consider the probability distribution
of the random variable: number of bank defaults in the time interval [0, T ], T = 1.
The loss distribution in [0, T ], T = 1, is evaluated using statistical simulation on a
set of 104 numerically generated trajectories of (23), (24), (3). In Figures 5b)-7b)
the dashed line represents the loss distribution of the independent diffusion processes
solution of (1), (4), (3) when N = 10, that is of the solution of system (23), (24),
(3) when α = γ = 0, N = 10, ξ(t) = 0, t ∈ [0, T ], T = 1, ǫ = 0, while the solid line
represents the loss distribution of the diffusion processes solution of system (23), (24),
(3) when N = 10, ξ(t) = 0.5 sin(2πt), t ∈ [0, T ], T = 1, ǫ = 0.05, for the following
values of the parameters α and γ: α = 100, γ = −10 (Figure 5b)), α = 50, γ = −50
(Figure 6b)) and α = 10, γ = −100 (Figure 7b)).
Figures 5-7 show how the banking system model (23), (24), (3) is stabilized by
the two cooperation mechanisms discussed previously. In particular Figures 5-7 show
the different effects of these two mechanisms. When α and γ are constants and α
dominates over |γ|, that is when α >> |γ|, (see Figure 5) we are in a situation similar
to the situation discussed in Section 2 for the Fouque and Sun model (5), (4), (3)
and presented in Figures 1-3. In this case the effect of the borrowing and lending
activity among banks is dominant. This mechanism when α increases improves the
stability of the individual bank at the expense of an increased probability of extreme
systemic risk. Moreover Figure 5 shows the “swarming effect” along the trajectory
ξ+t , t ∈ [0, T ], T = 1, induced by the term dξ
+
t in (23). When α and γ are constants
and |γ| dominates over α, that is when α << |γ| (see Figure 7) the effect of the
borrowing and lending activity between banks and monetary authority is dominant.
This mechanism stabilizes the empirical mean of the log-monetary reserves of the
banks along the trajectory ξ−t , t ∈ [0, T ], T = 1, without changing substantially the
probability of systemic risk. This stabilization effect increases when |γ| increases.
Note that the stabilization of the empirical mean of the log-monetary reserves of the
banks around a “safe” target trajectory is useful to protect the banking system from
systemic failures. In fact empirical mean of the log-monetary reserves of the banks
stabilized around a “safe” target trajectory means that if there is a failed bank (i.e. a
bank with log-monetary reserves below the “safe” target trajectory and in fact below
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the default level) there must be a bank or a group of banks that are “prosperous”
(i.e. banks with log-monetary reserves above the “safe” target trajectory). In this
situation it is possible for a prosperous bank or for a consortium of prosperous banks
to rescue the failed one or the failed ones. In the intermediate cases, that is when α is
of the same order of magnitude of |γ| (see Figure 6) the effects of the two mechanisms
are balanced.
It is easy to understand that given the default level D raising the target trajectory
ξt, t > 0, (i.e. increasing ξt−D > 0, t > 0) decreases the probability of systemic risk in
a bounded time interval. However raising the target trajectory has the consequence
of raising the log-monetary reserves of the banks. This fact discourages economic
activity. Note that the loss of economic activity induced by the raise of ξt, t > 0,
is an undesired effect not considered in our model. Similarly decreasing the target
trajectory ξt, t > 0, (i.e. decreasing ξt − D > 0, t > 0) increases the probability of
systemic risk in a bounded time interval and has the consequence of decreasing the
log-monetary reserves of the banks. We conclude that the monetary authority must
pursue the goal of avoiding systemic failures keeping the log-monetary reserves of the
banks as small as possible.
4 An optimal control problem for the mean-field
equations
Let R+ be the set of positive real numbers. Note that both the mean field equation
(6) of the banking system model (5), (4), (3) and the mean field equation (25) of the
banking system model (23), (24), (3) are of the form:
dZt = β(t,Zt)dt+ σdWt, t > 0, (29)
where the function β : R+ × R → R is a sufficiently regular function. In fact the
choices Zt = Yt, t ≥ 0, and
β = βt = β(t,Yt) = −αYt, t > 0, (30)
reduce (29) to (6), similarly the choices Zt = Xt, t ≥ 0, and
β = βt = β(t,Xt) = α
(
X¯t −Xt
)
+ γ
(
X¯t − ξ
−
t
)
+ (ξ+t )
′, t > 0, (31)
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Figure 5: a) The solid line shows one trajectory of X1
t
, t ∈ [0, T ], T = 1, solution of system (23),
(24), (3) when N = 10, ǫ = 0.05, α = 100, γ = −10. The dashed line shows the target trajectory
ξ(t) = 0.5 sin(2πt), t ∈ [0, T ], T = 1. The thick solid line shows one trajectory of the solution Xt,
t ∈ [0, T ], T = 1, of the corresponding mean field initial value problem (25), (26), (27). The dotted
line shows the default level D = −0.7. b) Loss distribution in [0, T ], T = 1, of system (23), (24),
(3) when N = 10, ǫ = 0.05, α = 100, γ = −10 (solid line) and loss distribution in [0, T ], T = 1, of
system (23), (24), (3) when N = 10, ǫ = 0, α = γ = 0 (dashed line).
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Figure 6: a) The solid line shows one trajectory of the solution X1
t
, t ∈ [0, T ], T = 1, of system
(23), (24), (3) when N = 10, ǫ = 0.05, α = 50, γ = −50. The dashed line shows the target trajectory
ξ(t) = 0.5 sin(2πt), t ∈ [0, T ], T = 1. The thick solid line shows one trajectory of Xt, t ∈ [0, T ],
T = 1, solution of the corresponding mean field initial value problem (25), (26), (27). The dotted
line shows the default level D = −0.7. b) Loss distribution in [0, T ], T = 1, of system (23), (24),
(3) when N = 10, ǫ = 0.05, α = 50, γ = −50 (solid line) and loss distribution in [0, T ], T = 1, of
system (23), (24), (3) when N = 10, ǫ = 0, α = γ = 0 (dashed line).
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Figure 7: a) The solid line shows one trajectory of X1
t
, t ∈ [0, T ], T = 1, solution of system (23),
(24), (3) when N = 10, ǫ = 0.05, α = 10, γ = −100. The dashed line shows the target trajectory
ξ(t) = 0.5 sin(2πt), t ∈ [0, T ], T = 1. The thick solid line shows one trajectory of the solution Xt,
t ∈ [0, T ], T = 1, of the corresponding mean field initial value problem (25), (26), (27). The dotted
line shows the default level D = −0.7. b) Loss distribution in [0, T ], T = 1, of system (23), (24),
(3) when N = 10, ǫ = 0.05, α = 10, γ = −100 (solid line) and loss distribution in [0, T ], T = 1, of
system (23), (24), (3) when N = 10, ǫ = 0, α = γ = 0 (dashed line).
where (ξ+t )
′ =
dξ+t
dt
, t ≥ 0, and X¯t, t ≥ 0, is defined by (26), (27) reduce (29) to (25).
Finally note that the choices Zt = Xt, t ≥ 0, and
β = βt = β(t,Xt) = α
(
X¯t −Xt
)
+ γ
(
X¯t − ξt
)
+ (ξt)
′, t > 0, (32)
where X¯t, t ≥ 0, is defined by (20), (21) reduce (29) to (19). However, as already
seen in Section 3, equations (20), (21) imply X¯t = ξt, t ≥ 0, and this means that in
(32) γ is multiplied by zero.
In (6) and in (25) α and γ are constants. In this Section the parameters α and
γ are functions of time.
Let B be the set of the real square integrable processes defined in [0, T1], T1 > 0. A
real stochastic process ζ = ζt, t ∈ [0, T1], belongs to B if and only if E
(∫ T1
0
ζ2t dt
)
<
+∞.
Given the constants λ > 0, T1 > 0, and the target trajectory ξt, t ∈ [0, T1], let us
determine β = βt ∈ B as solution of the following stochastic optimal control problem:
min
β∈B
Uλ(β), (33)
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where
Uλ(β) = E
(∫ T1
0
[
(Zt − ξt)
2 + λβ2t
]
dt
)
, β = βt, t ∈ [0, T1], λ > 0, (34)
subject to the constraints:
dZt = β dt+ σdWt, t ∈ [0, T1], (35)
Z0 = ξ
+
0 . (36)
In the control problem (33), (34), (35), (36) the function Uλ(β), β = βt, t ∈ [0, T1],
λ > 0, is the utility function and β = βt, t ∈ [0, T1], is the control variable.
The utility function Uλ(β), β ∈ B, λ > 0, defined in (34) is the sum of two terms.
The first term, E
(∫ T1
0
(Zt − ξt)
2 dt
)
, penalizes the departure of Zt, t ∈ [0, T1], from
the target trajectory ξt, t ∈ [0, T1]. The second one, E
(∫ T1
0
λβ2t dt
)
, penalizes the
“size” of the control variable βt, t ∈ [0, T1].
We solve problem (33), (34), (35), (36) using the dynamic programming principle
(see [10]). That is let
V (t,Z) = min
βt∈B
E
(∫ T1
t
[
(Zτ − ξτ)
2 + λβ2τ
]
dτ
∣∣∣Zt = Z
)
,
Z ∈ R, t ∈ [0, T1], (37)
be the value function of the control problem (33), (34), (35), (36). The function
V (t,Z), Z ∈ R, t ∈ [0, T1], satisfies the following Hamilton, Jacobi, Bellman equation
(see [10]):
∂
∂t
V (t,Z) +
1
2
σ2
∂2
∂Z2
V (t,Z) +H
(
∂
∂Z
V (t,Z)
)
+ (Z − ξt)
2 = 0,
Z ∈ R, t ∈ [0, T1], (38)
with final condition:
V (T1,Z) = 0, Z ∈ R, (39)
where
H(p) = min
δ∈R
(
δp+ λδ2
)
= −
p2
4λ
, p ∈ R, (40)
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is the Hamiltonian function of the optimal control problem (33), (34), (35), (36).
Using (40) equation (38) becomes:
∂
∂t
V (t,Z) +
1
2
σ2
∂2
∂Z2
V (t,Z)−
1
4λ
(
∂
∂Z
V (t,Z)
)2
+ (Z − ξt)
2 = 0,
Z ∈ R, t ∈ [0, T1], (41)
with the final condition (39).
From the knowledge of the value function V solution of (41), (39) we determine
the optimal control βt, t ∈ [0, T1], solution of (33), (34), (35), (36) using the condition:
β = βt = β(t,Zt) = −
1
2λ
∂
∂Z
V (t,Z)
∣∣∣
Z=Zt
, t ∈ [0, T1], (42)
where Zt, t ∈ [0, T1], is the solution of (35), (36) when β=βt, t ∈ [0, T1], is given by
(42).
Proposition 1 reduces the solution of (41), (39) to the solution of a final value
problem for a system of ordinary differential equations.
Proposition 1. A solution of problem (41), (39) is given by:
V (t,Z) = a(t) + b(t)Z + c(t)Z2, Z ∈ R, t ∈ [0, T1], (43)
where the functions a(t), b(t), c(t), t ∈ [0, T1], are solution of the following final value
problem for a system of Riccati ordinary differential equations:
∂
∂t
a = −σ2c+
b2
4λ
− ξ2t , t ∈ [0, T1], a(T1) = 0, (44)
∂
∂t
b =
bc
λ
+ 2ξt, t ∈ [0, T1], b(T1) = 0, (45)
∂
∂t
c =
c2
λ
− 1, t ∈ [0, T1], c(T1) = 0. (46)
The optimal control β = βt, t ∈ [0, T1], solution of problem (33), (34), (35), (36)
determined by the value function (43) is:
β = βt = β(t,Zt) = −
1
2λ
(b(t) + 2c(t)Zt) , t ∈ [0, T1]. (47)
Proof. Let V (t,Z), Z ∈ R, t ∈ [0, T1], be of the form (43) (see [10]), substituting
(43) in (41), (39) and using the polynomial identity principle it is easy to see that
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problem (41), (39) reduces to the final value problem (44), (45), (46). Equation (47)
for the optimal control of problem (33), (34), (35), (36) follows from (43), (42).
Note that the constraint (35) of the optimal control problem (33), (34), (35),
(36) is a model equation that can represent the mean field equations (6) or (25) when
we have respectively Zt = Yt, t ≥ 0, or Zt = Xt, t ≥ 0, and equations (30) or (31)
hold. Problem (33), (34), (35), (36) is the optimal control problem for the mean
field approximation (25), (26), (27) of (23), (24), (3) used to control the behaviour
of the trajectories of the banking system model (23), (24), (3). In fact we determine
the functions αt, γt, t ∈ [0, T1], that must be substituted in (23), (24), (3) to force
the trajectories of (23), (24), (3) to swarm around ξt, t ∈ [0, T1], from the optimal
control (47) of problem (33), (34), (35), (36) imposing Zt = Xt, t ∈ [0, T1], and (31).
Comparing the optimal control (47) with equation (31) when Zt = Xt, t ∈ [0, T1],
and using the polynomial identity principle we have:
αt =
c(t)
λ
, t ∈ [0, T1], (48)
γt =
1
X¯t − ξ
−
t
(
−
c(t)
λ
X¯t −
1
2λ
b(t)− (ξ+t )
′
)
, t ∈ [0, T1]. (49)
Note that the function X¯t, t ∈ [0, T1], is defined by the equations (26), (27) and
contains an integral that depends from γt, t ∈ [0, T1]. This means that equation (49)
is an integral equation in the unknown γt, t ∈ [0, T1]. The conditions α = αt ≥ 0,
γ = γt ≤ 0, t ∈ [0, T1], imposed in (28) are constraints that must be satisfied. When
they are not satisfied by the choices of αt, γt, t ∈ [0, T1], made in (48), (49) they
must be enforced. Let us point out that in the numerical experiments discussed in
Section 5 the function αt, t ∈ [0, T1], determined by (48) is always positive while the
function γt, t ∈ [0, T1], determined by (49) is not always smaller or equal than zero.
When the function γt determined by (49) is positive, we enforce the choice γt = 0 to
guarantee (28). More in general the enforcement of the constraints (28) can be done
solving the equations (48), (49) in the least squares sense after imposing (28) as a
constraint. The choice of αt, γt, t ∈ [0, T1], that follows from (48), (49), (28) induces
a swarming effect of the trajectories of (23), (24), (3) around the target trajectory ξt,
t ∈ [0, T1], similar to the swarming effect induced by the optimal control β soultion
of (33), (34), (35), (36) on the trajectories of (35), (36).
Note that the polynomial identity principle can be used when we compare (47)
with (31) but cannot be used if we compare (47) with (30) or with (32). In this last
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case this is due to the fact that in (32) γ is multiplied by zero. In fact in (30) and (32)
β is a polynomial of degree one respectively in Yt and in Xt with only one coefficient
that can be chosen. This is the reason to consider model (23), (24), (3) instead of
model (12), (13), (3).
Note that proceeding as done previously a possibly high dimensional dynamical
system (i.e. the banking system model (23), (24), (3)) is controlled using a law (i.e.
the law (48), (49), (28)) deduced from the solution of a control problem (i.e. problem
(33), (34), (35), (36)) for a low dimensional dynamical system (i.e. the mean field
equations (25), (26), (27) of the banking system model (23), (24), (3)).
The possibility, exploited here, of governing a high dimensional dynamical sys-
tem using its mean field approximation, is based on the fact that in the problem
considered the population of agents (i.e. the population of banks) described by the
high dimensional dynamical system is homogeneous (i.e. the banks are all equal and
in the limit N goes to infinity all the banks behave like the mean bank). This feature
of the banking system model (23), (24), (3) is a rather common feature that is found
in many other circumstances in science and engineering.
5 Systemic risk governance
Let 0 ≤ τ1 < τ2 < +∞ we consider in the model (23), (24), (3) the problem of
governing the probability of systemic risk in the bounded time interval [τ1, τ2]. The
systemic risk governance is based on the choice of the target trajectory ξt, t ∈ [τ1, τ2],
and of the parameter ǫ > 0. The governance exploits the solution of the control
problem (33), (34), (35), (36), and its relation with the banking system model (23),
(24), (3) when the functions αt, γt, t ∈ [τ1, τ2], are chosen as suggested by (48), (49),
(28). The goal of the governance is to keep the probability of systemic risk in the
time interval [τ1, τ2], P(SR[τ1,τ2]), between two given thresholds. Given ǫ this goal
is pursued choosing at time t = τ1 the target trajectory ξt, t ∈ [τ1, τ2]. In fact we
know that increasing ξt − D > 0, t ∈ [τ1, τ2], the systemic risk probability in [τ1, τ2]
decreases and that decreasing ξt−D > 0, t ∈ [τ1, τ2], the systemic risk probability in
[τ1, τ2] increases.
Going into details given ǫ, the thresholds S1, S2 such that 0 < S1 < S2 < 1 and
ξτ1 we want to determine a target trajectory ξt, t ∈ [τ1, τ2], such that the probability
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of systemic risk in the time interval [τ1, τ2] satisfies the following inequalities:
S1 ≤ P(SR[τ1,τ2]) ≤ S2. (50)
Let us define some simple rules that can be used to choose ξt, t ∈ [τ1, τ2]. At time
t = τ1 the “simplest” choice for the target trajectory in the time interval [τ1, τ2]
is ξt = ξτ1 , t ∈ [τ1, τ2]. In correspondence to this choice the monetary authority
determines the functions αt, γt, t ∈ [τ1, τ2], using (48), (49), (28) and evaluates the
probability of systemic risk in the time interval [τ1, τ2] associated to the choices of ξt,
αt, γt, t ∈ [τ1, τ2] done, that is evaluates P(SR[τ1,τ2]). Note that P(SR[τ1,τ2]) depends
not only from ξt, αt, γt, t ∈ [τ1, τ2], but also from the values taken by the variables
X iτ1 , i = 1, 2, . . . , N . Based on the value of P(SR[τ1,τ2]) the monetary authority acts
as follows:
Strategy 1: if P(SR[τ1,τ2]) < S1 the monetary authority changes the choice
of target trajectory ξt, t ∈ [τ1, τ2], to “swarm” the trajectories of the banking
system model (23), (24), (3) “downward” (i.e. decreases ξt−D > 0, t ∈ [τ1, τ2]);
Strategy 2: if P(SR[τ1,τ2]) > S2 the monetary authority changes the choice of
target trajectory ξt, t ∈ [τ1, τ2], to “swarm” the trajectories of the banking
system model (23), (24), (3) “upward” (i.e. increases ξt −D > 0, t ∈ [τ1, τ2]);
Strategy 3: if S1 ≤ P(SR[τ1,τ2]) ≤ S2 the monetary authority leaves the target
trajectory chosen, that is ξt = ξτ1 , t ∈ [τ1, τ2], unchanged.
Let us discuss some numerical experiments that illustrate a simple implementa-
tion of the previous strategies. In the numerical experiments we present the simula-
tion of the governance of the systemic risk in the next year during a period of two
years. The governance takes place quarterly and consists, at the beginning of each
quarter, in choosing the target trajectory of the log-monetary reserves of the “ideal
bank” in the next year and in translating this choice in rules for the banks determin-
ing the values of the functions αt, γt in the next year using (48), (49), (28). These
choices are done pursuing the goal of enforcing the probability of systemic risk in the
next year to satisfy the inequalities (50). For simplicity we restrict the choice of the
target trajectory to a finite set of functions constructed with some simple rules.
In the first numerical experiment we study the governance of the probability of
systemic risk in the next year when there are no shocks acting on the banking system.
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In the second and in the third numerical experiment we study the governance of the
probability of systemic risk in the next year in presence of positive and negative shocks
acting on the banking system. These shocks are represented as abrupt changes of σ,
that is we consider σ = σt, t > 0, to be a piecewise constant function.
Numerical experiment 1. We choose a time horizon T2 of three years, that is
T2 = 3, and the time step of the governance decisions ∆τ = 1/4, that is we take
systemic risk governance decisions quarterly. In the time interval [0, T2] we consider
the time intervals [τ j1 , τ
j
2 ] ⊂ [0, T2], T2 = 3, where τ
j
1 = j · ∆τ and τ
j
2 = τ
j
1 + 1,
j = 0, 1, . . . , 8. The remaining parameters of the model used in the numerical example
are: N = 10, ξ0 = 1, ǫ = 0.1, λ = 0.001, S1 = 0.03, S2 = 0.05, D = 0.3, σ = 1.
Note that in this experiment we have σ = σt = 1, t ∈ [0, T2], T2 = 3. The choice
of constant volatility corresponds to the fact that there are no shocks acting on the
banking system during the time interval considered. In the numerical experiments
the number N = 10 of banks is constant during the time evolution, that is there are
no bank defaults during the time evolution.
In each time interval [τ j1 , τ
j
2 ], j = 0, 1, . . . , 8, the model (23), (24), (3) reduces to:
dX it =
α
N
N∑
j=1
(
Xjt −X
i
t
)
dt+ γ
(
1
N
N∑
j=1
Xjt − ξ
−
t
)
dt+ dξ+t + σdW
i
t ,
t ∈ [τ j1 , τ
j
2 ], i = 1, 2, . . . , N, j = 0, 1, . . . , 8, (51)
with initial condition:
X iτ0
1
= ξ+0 , i = 1, 2, . . . , N, X
i
τ
j
1
= X i
τ
j−1
2
, i = 1, 2, . . . , N, j = 1, 2, . . . , 8, (52)
and
E(dW it dW
k
t ) = δi,kdt, t ∈ [τ
j
1 , τ
j
2 ], i, k = 1, 2, . . . , N, j = 0, 1, . . . , 8. (53)
As explained in Section 2, for j = 0, 1, . . . , 8, the probability of systemic risk in
the time interval [τ j1 , τ
j
2 ] in the model (51), (52), (53) is evaluated using statistical
simulation starting from 104 trajectories of (51), (52), (53) generated numerically.
These trajectories are obtained integrating (51), (52), (53) using the explicit Euler
method with time step ∆t = 10−4.
For j = 0, 1, . . . , 8 in order to keep the probability of systemic risk in the time
interval [τ j1 , τ
j
2 ] between the thresholds S1 = 0.03 and S2 = 0.05, we give to the
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monetary authority eight choices of target trajectory that push the trajectories of
the j-th model (51), (52), (53) “downward” and eight choices of target trajectory
that push the trajectories of the j-th model (51), (52), (53) “upward”. Finally the
monetary authority has the possibility of choosing the target trajectory constant
during the next year and equal to its value at the decision time. This last choice
leaves the trajectories of the j-th model (51), (52), (53) “unchanged”, that is it does
not push them “upward” or “downward”. The piecewise linear functions listed in
(54) are the target trajectories used to implement these choices.
Initially, for simplicity, starting from ξ0 = 1, ǫ = 0.1, the monetary authority
chooses ξt = ξ
+
0 = ξ0 + ǫ = 1.1, t ∈ [τ
0
1 , τ
0
2 ] = [0, 1] as target trajectory. For j =
0, 1, . . . , 8, given the time interval [τ j1 , τ
j
2 ], the monetary authority assumes ξt = ξτ j
1
,
t ∈ [τ j1 , τ
j
2 ], and evaluates P(SR[τ j
1
,τ
j
2
]). Depending from the value of P(SR[τ j
1
,τ
j
2
]) the
monetary authority acts as suggested by Strategy 1-Strategy 3. This last step is done
choosing one of the following target trajectories:
Pn : ξt = ξt,n =


n
8
(t− τ j1 ) + ξτ j
1
, t ∈ [τ j1 , τ
j
1 +∆τ ],
n
8
∆t + ξ
τ
j
1
, t ∈ (τ j1 +∆τ, τ
j
2 ],
n = −8,−7, .., 0, .., 7, 8. (54)
Note that in (54) when 0 < n ≤ 8 (respectively −8 ≤ n < 0) the target trajectory is
a non decreasing (respectively non increasing) piecewise linear function. When n = 0
the target trajectory is constant. Recall that we are always assuming that ξt−D > 0,
t ∈ [τ j1 , τ
j
2 ], and that choices of target trajectories defined in (54) that violate this
constraint are not considered. That is when the monetary authority chooses a target
trajectory Pn with 0 < n ≤ 8 in the time interval [τ
j
1 , τ
j
2 ] the trajectories of the
banking system model (51), (52), (53) move “upward” and the probability of systemic
risk in the next year decreases, vice versa when the monetary authority chooses a
target trajectory Pn with −8 ≤ n < 0 in the time interval [τ
j
1 , τ
j
2 ] the trajectories of
the banking system model (51), (52), (53) move “downward” and the probability of
systemic risk in the next year increases. Finally when the monetary authority chooses
the target trajectory P0 in the time interval [τ
j
1 , τ
j
2 ], the character of the trajectories
of the banking system model (51), (52), (53) is left unchanged and the corresponding
probability of systemic risk in the next year is left approximately unchanged.
Note that the choices made in (54) are only illustrative. Many other choices of
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target trajectories are possible to implement Strategy 1-Strategy 3.
In Figures 8-10 we show the governance of model (51), (52), (53) made by the
monetary authority at the beginning of each quarter pursuing the goal of keeping
the probability of systemic risk in the next year between the thresholds S1 = 0.03
and S2 = 0.05. In Figures 8-10 the choices of target trajectories considered at the
beginning of each quarter by the monetary authority in the decision making process
are shown. The target trajectory marked with a dot at its endpoint is the final choice
of target trajectory made by the monetary authority. The monetary authority runs
through the possible choices of target trajectories listed in (54) in their natural or-
der according to Strategy 1-Strategy 3 starting from the choice P0 and evaluates the
probability of systemic risk in the next year associated to each target trajectory con-
sidered before making its final decision (see Figures 8-10). The first target trajectory
encountered that has the associated probability of systemic risk in the next year that
satisfies (50) is chosen. Figure 11 shows the probability of systemic risk in the next
year evaluated at the beginning of each quarter during the time interval [0, 2] both
in presence and in absence of governance. In presence of governance the probability
shown is the probability of systemic risk in the next year evaluated at the beginning
of each quarter when the target trajectory chosen is the final choice made by the
monetary authority in that quarter marked with a dot at its endpoint in Figures
8-10. In absence of governance we choose ξt = ξ0 = 1, αt = 20, γt = −1, t ∈ [0, T2],
T2 = 3, ǫ = 0.1, and we evaluate the probability of systemic risk in the next year at
the beginning of each quarter. The choices made in absence of governance guarantee
that the probability of systemic risk in the next year at time t = 0 is between the
given thresholds.
Recall that in the Numerical experiment 1 we have σ = σt = 1, t ∈ [0, T2],
T2 = 3. Figures 8-10 show that, when the volatility σ is constant in the time interval
[0, T2], T2 = 3, the systemic risk governance of the monetary authority is reduced to
the choice of the target trajectory at the beginning of the time interval considered,
that is at time t = 0. When this choice is done correctly continuing with a constant
target trajectory or with small variations of it in each successive time interval [τ j1 , τ
j
2 ],
j = 0, 1, . . . , 8, is sufficient to keep the probability of systemic risk in the next year
between the given thresholds. Figure 11 shows that, when the volatility σ is constant
in the time interval [0, T2], T2 = 3, the presence or absence of governance does not
make a significant difference provided that in absence of governance a good choice
of the target trajectory and of the values of the parameter α and γ is done at time
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t = 0.
In the next experiments we consider two examples of non constant volatility in
the time interval [0, T2], T2 = 3, that is we consider the case when there are shocks
acting on the banking system during the time interval considered.
Numerical experiments 2 and 3. The setting of the Numerical experiments 2 and
3 is the same one of Numerical experiment 1 except for the fact that in these two
experiments the volatility σ is not constant. We allow abrupt changes of volatility to
model shocks acting on the banking system.
In Numerical experiment 2 we choose the volatility σ as follows:
σ = σ1,t =
{
1, t ∈ [0, 1],
1.5, t ∈ (1, 3].
(55)
In Numerical experiment 3 we choose the volatility σ as follows:
σ = σ2,t =


1, t ∈ [0, 0.8],
0.3, t ∈ (0.8, 1.2],
1.3, t ∈ (1.2, 3].
(56)
The function (55) models a positive volatility shock, while the function (56) models
a negative volatility shock followed by a positive one.
Note that in the Numerical experiments 2 and 3 at the beginning of each quarter
the monetary authority in the process of making its decision about systemic risk
governance assumes that the volatility in the next year is constant at its present
value. That is the monetary authority does not foresee the volatility shocks, simply
reacts to them when they occur.
Figures 12-14 show the governance of the banking system model (51), (52), (53)
in the time interval [τ j1 , τ
j
2 ], j = 0, 1, . . . , 8, made by the monetary authority at the
beginning of each quarter in order to keep the probability of systemic risk during
the next year between the thresholds S1 = 0.03 and S2 = 0.05 when the volatility σ
is given by (55). Figures 16-18 show the same quantities of Figures 12-14 when the
volatility σ is given by (56). In particular in each image of Figures 12-14 and of Figures
16-18 we show the choices of the target trajectories for the next year considered by
the monetary authority at the beginning of each quarter and the final choice of the
target trajectory for the next year made at the beginning of each quarter (marked
with a dot at its endpoint). Figure 15 and 19 show respectively in the time interval
[0, 2] the probability of systemic risk in the next year evaluated at the beginning
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of each quarter both in presence and in absence of governance for the Numerical
experiments 2 and 3. In absence of governance as done in Numerical experiment 1
we have chosen: ξt = 1, αt = 20, γt = −1, t ∈ [0, T2], T2 = 3, ǫ = 0.1.
Figures 12-19 show that, as expected, the governance of the systemic risk in
presence of positive and/or negative volatility shocks is more demanding than in
absence of volatility shocks. Nevertheless Figures 12-19 show that the elementary
systemic risk governance outlined in this Section after a few adjustments is able to
keep the probability of systemic risk in the next year between the assigned thresholds.
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Figure 12: Numerical experiment 2: choices of target trajectory considered by the monetary
authority at the beginning of a quarter; the target trajectory marked with a dot at its endpoint is
the final choice of the monetary authority.
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Figure 13: Numerical experiment 2: choices of target trajectory considered by the monetary
authority at the beginning of a quarter; the target trajectory marked with a dot at its endpoint is
the final choice of the monetary authority.
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Figure 14: Numerical experiment 2: choices of target trajectory considered by the monetary
authority at the beginning of a quarter; the target trajectory marked with a dot at its endpoint is
the final choice of the monetary authority.
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Figure 15: Numerical experiment 2: probability of systemic risk in the next year evaluated at the
beginning of each quarter in the time interval [0, T2] = [0, 2] in presence of governance (∗) and in
absence of governance ().
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Figure 16: Numerical experiment 3: choices of target trajectory considered by the monetary
authority at the beginning of a quarter; the target trajectory marked with a dot at its endpoint is
the final choice of the monetary authority.
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Figure 17: Numerical experiment 3: choices of target trajectory considered by the monetary
authority at the beginning of a quarter; the target trajectory marked with a dot at its endpoint is
the final choice of the monetary authority.
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Figure 18: Numerical experiment 3: choices of target trajectory considered by the monetary
authority at the beginning of a quarter; the target trajectory marked with a dot at its endpoint is
the final choice of the monetary authority.
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Figure 19: Numerical experiment 3: probability of systemic risk in the next year evaluated at the
beginning of each quarter in the time interval [0, T2] = [0, 2] in presence of governance (∗) and in
absence of governance ().
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